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Taxation of Capital Gains*
By George O. May

The treatment of capital gains under a steeply graduated
income-tax law constitutes one of the most difficult problems in
fiscal legislation as is sufficiently evidenced by the changes con
tained in successive revenue acts. Impartial students of the
subject will, it is believed, agree that the present state of the law
is not satisfactory, and among the remedies which are receiving
consideration is the abandonment of the taxation of capital gains
and of the allowance of capital losses as a deduction from tax
able income. In Great Britain, where capital gains have not
heretofore been taxed or capital losses allowed as deductions,
the question is being debated whether some change in the law
is not necessary on account of the avoidance of taxation of what
is essentially income by clothing it in the garb of capital. The
time, therefore, seems opportune for a discussion of the problem.
By capital gain is meant the profit upon the realization of
assets otherwise than in the ordinary course of business, this
profit being the excess of the proceeds of realization over the
cost of the property realized.
In considering the proper treatment of capital gains under
an income-tax law it is desirable to keep in mind three different
causes which may make a capital gain possible. These are:
(1) Change in absolute value due to natural growth or simi
lar causes;
(2) Change in relative value of property in comparison
with other property, due to external causes;
(3) Change in the money value of property due to depre
ciation or appreciation of currency.
In most cases of course a capital gain is due to a com
bination of these influences, some perhaps operating in a favor*A paper read at the annual meeting of the American Institute of Accountants,
Chicago, Illinois, September 20, 1922.
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able, others in an unfavorable, direction. All three, for instance,
operating favorably might be found on the sale in the spring
of 1919 of a privately owned barrel of whisky bought as new
whisky in 1913. There would be, first, the increase in absolute
value due to ageing, second, the increase in relative value due
to the legislation enacted in January, 1919, and, third, the in
crease in money value, common to nearly all property, resulting
from the expansion of currency and credit during the war.
Looking at the problem from the standpoint of principle,
- the gain due to the first cause is clearly only a special form of
investment income and therefore naturally comes within the pur
view of an income tax. Gains due to the second cause are real
gains, and therefore fairly taxable, even if not ordinary income.
Indeed if discrimination in favor of earned income as against
investment income is well founded, it may well be argued that
these gains from unearned increment should be regarded as
less entitled to consideration than ordinary recurring invest
ment income.
Gains from the third cause are more apparent than real.
There would seem to be no true income or gain from selling
property at double its cost, if anything which can be bought with
the proceeds is also selling at double its former price. This has
been a common situation in recent years and has been com
plicated by the factor of involuntary sale or realization. In
recent tax laws attempts have been made to meet it, first, by re
placement fund provisions under which no taxable profit is
deemed to be derived from an involuntary sale if the proceeds are
put aside to be employed in replacing the property, and, secondly,
by the provisions in the 1921 law permitting exchanges of prop
erty without any liability to taxes as a result thereof.
As a practical proposition it would be impossible to analyze
every capital gain into its component elements and apply
different rules to different elements. In particular it would
be a hopeless task to convince the average taxpayer who
had completed a transaction showing a loss, that he should pay
a tax on the transaction because the loss was found upon analy
sis to be made up of an increase of value due to the first or
second of the three causes above mentioned and therefore tax
able, offset by a larger loss arising from the third cause and
therefore outside the scope of the tax law.
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The alternatives, therefore, are to tax all gains or to ex
clude all gains, except such as can be covered by simple rules.
In considering the question whether capital gains should be taxed
the successive points which arise are—
1. Is it in principle desirable to tax capital gains ?
2. If so, should capital losses be allowed as a deduction
from taxable income? And
3. If both the first and second questions are answered in
the affirmative, how serious are the dangers of evasion
and how far is it practicable to guard against them?
It must be understood that the danger of avoidance is not
disposed of by excluding capital gains and losses from the
scope of the income tax, as is evidenced by the movement in
England already referred to. A majority of economists would
probably take the view that capital gains are not a proper subject
for taxation under the guise of an income tax. Apart from this
technical point, however, it would seem that in principle capital
gains would form a most appropriate subject of taxation and
the supreme court has held that they can be taxed as income.
Some theoretical considerations have already been briefly recited.
Among other reasons which would have weight with a states
man as well as with a politician is the fact that the great accu
mulations of wealth by individuals in the country have largely
been the result of capital gains, and the salary or wage-earning
classes might quite naturally feel that they were being unjustly
discriminated against if they were taxed on their salaries or
wages and the large capital gains of the very wealthy should
escape taxation. Moreover, even if the taxation of capital gains
be regarded as necessarily involving the allowance of capital
losses, it would seem that treating both on the footing of in
come would ordinarily be expedient in a developing country in
which naturally the capital gains would far exceed the capital
losses. This proposition is, however, subject to the important
qualification that it holds only so long as the form and degree
of taxation are not such as to discourage the realization of gains
and encourage the taking of losses, and thus to cause a serious
disturbance of the normal balance between gains and losses.
Turning to the second point, while it may seem that in
justice the rules regarding gains and losses in a tax law should
be as nearly as possible similar, it may be recalled that this
principle has not usually been applied in our income-tax laws.
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Even in the case of ordinary business until the enactment of the
present law a taxpayer who made a profit on trading in one
year and an exactly similar loss in another paid tax on the profit
and obtained no relief in respect of the loss. As regards losses
not incurred in the taxpayer’s trade or business the act of 1913
allowed no deduction and the act of 1916 allowed a deduction
only to the amount of the gains of a similar character included
in the same return. The tax rates under these acts were, how
ever, small as we now reckon tax rates and the problem becomes
difficult only when taxes are large. In 1917 when the maximum
rate of tax was increased from 15% to 67% the limitation on
the deduction of losses contained in the act of 1916 was con
tinued, but in 1918 when the maximum tax was still further in
creased to 77% all limitations on deductions of capital losses
were removed.
Even under this law if a taxpayer pursued the even tenor
of his way undisturbed, taking capital gains or capital losses
as his judgment of present and prospective values dictated, and
entirely uninfluenced by tax considerations, he was not in the
position that tax relief resulting from a loss was exactly equiva
lent to the tax burden resulting from an equal gain. Such a
taxpayer, if he incurred losses was thereby relieved from surtax
at the rates he would have paid on his regular income; if on
the other hand he made a profit he paid surtaxes at the higher
rates applying to income in excess of his regular income.
Thus to take the case of a man who had a regular income in
each of the years 1919 and 1920 of $50,000 and sold one in
vestment at a capital loss of $20,000 on December 31, 1919, and
another at a capital gain of $20,000 on January 1, 1920, in 1919
he paid on an income of $30,000 a total tax of $3,890.00; in 1920
on an income of $70,000 a total tax of $16,490.00, together $20,380.00. If however, both transactions had fallen in the same
year he would have paid on an income of $50,000 in each year
a tax of $9,190.00; a total for the two years of $18,380.00 and
his capital gain therefore cost him in taxation $2,000.00 more
than he saved on his capital loss though the tax rates were the
same in both years.
However, this discrimination against the taxpayer was of
relatively minor consequence compared with the wholesale loss
to the government resulting from the fact that taxpayers liable
to heavy rates of surtax very generally refrained from taking
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profits, but not from taking losses. It is impossible now to
estimate the loss of taxes which resulted from this disturbance
of the normal policy of investors, but it must have been enorm
ous. At the same time transfers which were desirable from the
broad standpoint of public welfare were retarded or prevented.
Men of advanced years, who were anxious to turn over their
business affairs to younger and more vigorous men, were de
terred from doing so by the tax which would have fallen upon
them in the event of a sale;, and in innumerable ways the ordi
nary course of business was effected by the artificial restraint
on sales at a profit and the encouragement of sales at a loss.
To meet some phases of the problem, extensive new pro
visions were introduced in the act of 1921, mainly in two forms,
first, the limitation of the tax on capital gains in the case of in
vestments carried more than two years to 12½% and, second,
provisions under which capital assets could be exchanged rather
than sold without any tax being incurred. Under this law the
rule that what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander
invoked by taxpayers in support of the removal of the limitation
on deductible losses in 1918 was waived in favor of the tax
payer. Logically the converse of the first provision just referred
to would have been that a taxpayer sustaining a capital loss
should pay the ordinary tax on his regular income and deduct
therefrom 12%% of the amount of his capital loss. The act,
however, permits him to save the maximum surtax he would
otherwise have paid. Thus to use the same illustration as be
fore, under the existing law a taxpayer with a regular income
of $50,000, a capital gain of $20,000 in one year and a capital
loss of $20,000 in the next pays over the two years $2,800.00 less
than if both transactions had occurred in the same year.
In the case of the very wealthy, therefore, the present law
makes it distinctly advantageous to take capital gains one year
and pay a maximum tax of 12½% thereon and to take capital
losses in another year, saving the maximum surtax to which the
taxpayer would otherwise have been liable.
The position in regard to the exchanges is even more un
favorable to the government. A taxpayer holding stock of the
A. B. Company desires to dispose of it and to reinvest in the
stock of the C. D. Company. If the present market value of the
stock of the A. B. Company is less than its cost to him he sells
this stock and buys the stock of the C. D. Company and is en
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titled to a deduction from his taxable income of the loss on
sale. If, however, the market value of the stock of the A. B.
Company is above cost he arranges an exchange of this stock
for stock of the C. D. Company with a cash adjustment and
under the law he derives no taxable gain and therefore pays
no additional tax.
From this brief summary it will be seen that in less than
ten years the relation between the provisions regarding capital
gains and those regarding capital losses has been changed from
one of marked disparity in favor of the revenue to an even
greater disparity in favor of the taxpayer. Probably every
change has operated to the detriment of the revenue except to
the extent that legislation has been retroactive and heavy taxes
have been levied on transactions which would never have been
consummated if a change in the law had been anticipated. Re
troactive legislation, however, is not a desirable practice and
while it was doubtless justified in a time of world warfare, it
should be banned for the future like many other practices de
veloped during the war.
The above history of legislation since income taxes became
possible on March 1, 1913, suggests that though the' disparity
in favor of the taxpayers may be lessened, it would not be prac
ticable even if desirable to restore the old disparity in favor of
the government. It will be assumed, therefore, that if capital
gains are to be taxed capital losses must be allowed as deduc
tions on at least an equal basis. Though specific provisions may
facilitate tax avoidance or make it more difficult, the treasury
in dealing with all such problems suffers from the fundamental
disadvantage that it is the taxpayer who not only decides the
time and the form of transactions giving rise to capital gains or
losses but exercises the option whether they shall take place or
not. To use a military analogy, the initiative, whose value in
warfare is universally recognized, is always with the taxpayer.
The treasury has its fixed defences; the taxpayer moves only
after careful study of these defences; and it is not surprising
that the treasury, with a defence impregnable against a frontal
attack often finds itself helpless against an enveloping move
ment which attacks it in the flank or rear. This disadvantage is
increased by the fact that the distinction between ordinary in
come and capital gain is often a fine one, and a slight change in
the form of the transaction may throw it into one class or the
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other. If, therefore, the government decides to tax capital
gains and allow capital losses as deductions, the taxpayer can
refrain from taking gains but may take losses. If on the other
hand the government should exclude capital gains and capital
losses from the scope of the income tax altogether, there is
danger of transactions which essentially give rise to income
being cast into such a form that the gain would technically be
held to a capital gain. How fine the distinctions are, and inci
dentally how unexpected may be the results to the government
and to the taxpayer of any action outside the ordinary course
of business in a time when tax laws are rapidly changing both in
form and in degree of severity, is very well illustrated in the
case of the Phellis or du Pont case. This case and the Rocke
feller-Prairie Oil & Gas case, decided by the supreme court at
the same time, constitute two of the most complete, and in
amounts involved the most considerable, of the Pyrrhic vic
tories of the treasury in tax litigation. The point at issue was
not, of course, whether the transaction involved resulted in
a capital profit or in a profit in the nature of ordinary income
but what might seem a much simpler question, whether it re
sulted in any profit at all.
The amounts involved in the Phellis case are so large and
its features so striking as to make it worthy of detailed con
sideration.
The facts are briefly that the E. I. du Pont de Nemours
Powder Company of New Jersey in 1915 transferred all its
assets to a Delaware company in consideration of debentures
and stocks of that company and retaining debentures of the
Delaware company equal to the par of its common stock (ap
proximately $30,000,000) distributed to its common stockholders
two shares of Delaware company stock for each share of New
Jersey company (or an aggregate of $60,000,000). The mar
ket value of the Delaware company’s stock at the date of distri
bution was $347.50 per share. The supreme court has now
found that this distribution was a dividend taxable to the stock
holders of the New Jersey company and by this decision has
added to the taxable income of 1915 an amount of approximately
$210,000,000, or nearly 5% of the total taxable income dis
closed by all the individual tax returns of that year.
The five judges of the court of claims agreed in the view that
in substance there was no income to the stockholders of the New
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Jersey company because the stock of the Delaware company
represented the same property and business as the stock of the
New Jersey company had previously represented. This view
was supported, however, by only a minority of the supreme
court, the majority finding that both in substance and form
the stock of the Delaware company constituted real income to
the stockholders of the New Jersey company.
In passing it may be remarked that while each of the courts
looked beyond the form and discussed the substance of the trans
action—one finding that in substance there was no dividend, and
the other that the whole of the stock of the new company at its
market value constituted a dividend—in neither court was a third
alternative discussed which seems most accurately to reflect the
substance of the transaction. This alternative is that the stock
of the new company represented substantially what the old
stock had previously represented and that the old stock, which
after the transaction represented only an equal amount
of debentures of the new company, was the real dividend.
In substance the position of the stockholder after the trans
action was almost identically the position in which he
would have been placed had the New Jersey company created
$30,000,000 of debentures and issued them to the common stock
holders by way of dividend or even if it had sold $30,000,000
of debentures at par and paid the cash to its stockholders. After
the transaction the stock of the old company represented to the
stockholder of the old or New Jersey company something severed
from the du Pont property and business which he could realize
without reducing in any degree his proportionate interest in
the general du Pont assets.
The controversy extended over six years, during which any
one who was a stockholder at the time of the reorganization and
who subsequently sold a part or the whole of his stock in the
Delaware company was unable to determine whether under the
income-tax law he had made a profit or loss by doing so. If,
for instance, such a stockholder sold ten shares of the Delaware
company’s stock for $2,000.00 the transaction would, on the
government’s theory, result in a deductible loss of $1,475.00. If,
however, the government’s contentions were overthrown the re
sult would be a taxable profit of a rather greater sum. The gov
ernment having won, it is interesting to consider what this vic
tory has gained for it and what has been or will be the cost.
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The key-note of the decision by which the supreme court
held that stock dividends were not taxable was perhaps the
statement that a stock dividend provided nothing out of which
the stockholder could pay a tax without parting with some por
tion of his interest in the corporation. Assuming that the tax
payers who were called upon in 1921 to pay surtaxes on the
profits which they are deemed to have made in the transaction
of 1915 should have had recourse to the sale of their stock to
provide funds with which to pay their tax, what will their
position be?
The market value of the stock of the Delaware company
was at the time of the decision roughly par. Any holder who
received his stock as a dividend in 1915 pays tax in that year
on the basis of a value of $347.50 per share, and if he sold in
1921 he is entitled to claim a loss on sale in 1921 of $247.50 per
share. In 1915 the normal tax was 1% and surtaxes beginning
at incomes of $20,000 ranged from 1% to 6%; in 1921 the nor
mal tax was 8% and surtaxes beginning at incomes of $5,000
ranged from 1% to 65%. It will be apparent, therefore, at once
how great the advantages of the decision to a taxpayer may be.
Taking by way of illustration the case of a married man with
out dependents whose income apart from the dividend in 1915
or sale of stock in 1921 was $7,500 in each year, and assuming
that he held 10 shares of the New Jersey company’s stock and
received 20 shares of the Delaware company’s stock as dividend
in 1915, and that he sold this stock in 1921 at $100 a share, it
will be found that the dividend does not bring him into the
surtax class for 1915, so that he has no additional tax to pay
for that year, but the loss of sale in 1921 reduces his taxes for
that year from $320 to $2.
Multiplying the figures twenty-fold and taking a man whose
income was $150,000 in each year and whose original holding
of the New Jersey company’s stock was 200 shares, it will be
found that the addition of the dividend to his income for 1915
increases his taxes for that year by $5,950, and the loss on sale
in 1921 decreases his taxes for that year by $51,650.
The full effects of the decision are not reflected even in
these figures, as had the opposite decision been reached there
would have been a taxable profit instead of a loss on any sale
of stock in the Delaware company. Presumably the decision will
also involve considerable saving of tax to the Delaware company.
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No doubt some stockholders had sold a part or all of their
stock prior to 1921 and in other cases the stock is held by per
sons who would not, and perhaps could not without difficulty, sell
any great proportion of their holdings. The cost of the victory
to the government will, therefore, probably not come near its
potential limits.
It is, however, reasonably certain that the cost to the
government in the form of taxes lost will enormously exceed
the additional taxes recovered as a result of the decision, and
one is tempted to ask questions like those of the children in
Southey’s poem After Blenheim, and one finds no answer ex
cept Kaspar’s:
“But what they fought each other for
I could not well make out.
But everybody said,” quoth he,
“That ‘twas a famous victory.”
A similar analysis of the Rockefeller and Harkness cases
would lead to a similar conclusion.
The claim of the government was at best largely tech
nical since it could not be said that the du Pont stockholders
realized true income from the transaction in an amount ap
proaching the two hundred millions which the court held
must in law be deemed to be derived therefrom. The case
turned on the special facts of a very unusual transaction and
established no new principle, and the net result in the par
ticular case of the government’s contentions being upheld
was bound to be a loss of revenue. It is surprising therefore
that the government did not accept the verdict of the court
of claims.
The position after this decision and the stock dividend
decision (Macomber v. Eisner) would have been most un
satisfactory if congress had not in the 1921 law provided in
substance that no income should be deemed to be derived
from corporate reorganizations.
The interest of the case in relation to the subject of this
discussion lies in the evidence it affords of the room for wide
difference of opinion concerning the income-producing effect
of a transaction, even if the question is considered with regard
to its substance and not merely to its form.
The room for difference of opinion on the question
whether some of the complicated transactions of modern cor
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porate finance produce income in the narrower sense, capital
gains or no gain or income at all is obviously even greater.
A study of the subject over a period of many years has
led the writer to the conclusion that while either course is
fraught with danger and tax avoidance on a large scale is
bound to continue as long as high rates of surtaxes are main
tained, on the whole the losses of revenue involved in the
taxation of capital gains and the allowance of capital losses
as deductions from taxable income are greater than those
involved in the opposite course; further, that the margin
is so great as to outweigh the consideration that in principle
it is preferable to tax capital gains. Neither the war period,
with its extravagant gains and unmerited losses, nor the
period of readjustment immediately after the war was an
opportune time for a change of policy in this regard. As,
however, we get back to more normal conditions, such a
change seems worthy of the most serious considerations, more
especially as the existing law in remedying defects of the old
law has created new opportunities for tax avoidance from
which the government is bound to suffer very heavily.
If capital gains and losses are in general to be excluded
from the scope of the income tax, safeguards will be neces
sary to prevent a wholesale escape from taxation of income
by conversion into capital form. It is believed, however, that
three provisions would be sufficient to prevent the great bulk
of such evasion, namely,—

1—That where a capital gain or a capital loss arises in re
spect of an asset, which from its nature is subject to a
natural increment or decrement in value, any gain shall
be deemed to be income to the extent of a reasonable
return on the investment for the period during which it
has been held. Conversely the natural decrement should
be allowed as a deduction from taxable income.
2—That where property is disposed of within, say, two years
of its acquisition, the transaction shall be deemed to be
a trading transaction and not a capital investment.
3—A provision under which the tax would be levied on the
sale of stock of corporations, particularly private cor
porations, where it might appear that there was a profit
which was attributable to the accumulation of undivided
profits by the corporation and that the sale was made to
avoid the imposition of the tax which would be assessed
on such profits if distributed as dividends.
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Of the three provisions it is believed that only the third
would offer serious difficulty in its formulation and it should
readily be possible to surmount these difficulties with the
assistance of a group of persons familiar with business prac
tice and with tax procedure.
Doubtless the adoption of this suggestion would involve
the definite abandonment of a large amount of revenue which
the government ought some day to receive, but it is not be
lieved that the sacrifice of revenue which the government
would otherwise be likely to receive would approach in
amount the increase in revenue that would result from the
elimination of deductions for losses.
Tax avoidance on a substantial scale would doubtless
continue even if the suggestion were adopted, but this is
bound to be true under any law so long as the extreme sur
taxes now in force are continued. Most students of the sub
ject are in agreement with the views expressed by the secre
tary of the treasury in his letter to the chairman of the house
committee on ways and means of April, 1921, that the im
mediate loss of revenue that would result from the repeal
of the higher surtax brackets would be relatively small and
the ultimate effect should be an increase in the revenue. Con
gress apparently clung to the outworn idea that such a re
peal would result in a loss to the treasury for the sole bene
fit of the rich. It will, however, ultimately be forced to
recognize the shortsightedness of its policy, especially having
regard to the existence of the huge volume of tax-exempt
securities.
In justice to the present congress one must recognize
that not only is the problem an extremely difficult one but it
is made more difficult by the sacrifice of sound principles to
political expediency in the original adjustment of income
taxation to war necessities. Given a business world organ
ized largely in the form of private companies which are
practically incorporated partnerships, a world in which busi
ness transactions may readily be cast into different forms so
as to produce ordinary income or capital gains, as may be
the more advantageous, and given also a huge volume of taxfree securities—under such conditions the combination of a
low normal tax on income of individuals and corporations
with very high surtaxes is neither equitable nor effective.
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This is equally true whether capital gains and losses are
treated as entering into the determination of income or not.
The form of tax avoidance changes to meet either rule. The
only real solution is to reduce the disparity between normal
taxes and surtaxes.
Had the congress recognized these facts in war time and
raised the normal tax and the lower range of surtaxes to
higher levels as urged by the treasury, it would have been
possible later to make reductions all along the line. It is
not surprising, however, that the present congress should look
askance at a proposal to increase the normal tax and the
lower surtaxes and reduce the higher surtaxes. Though in
reality such a scheme would be sound finance and benefit
the entire community it seems on the surface too much like
a scheme to relieve the rich at the expense of the relatively
poor to be expedient from the standpoint of party politics.
It is certain, however, that the high surtaxes will prove in
creasingly ineffective and injurious the longer the present
system is continued.
In the meantime, it is believed that the revenues can be
increased, tax avoidance greatly diminished and greater equity
secured by the abandonment of the rule of taxing of capital
gains and, conversely, of allowing capital losses as a deduc
tion from taxable income.
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